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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) is widely acknowledged as a successful example of economic and political 
integration of nation states today - a slate of democratic institutions such as the European Parliament  
have also been developed and European citizens now possess extensive political and civil rights by 
virtue of the introduction of European citizenship. Nevertheless, the EU is said to suffer from a so called 
“democratic deficit” even as it seeks deeper and closer integration. Decades of institutional design and 
elite closed-door decisions has taken its toll on the inclusion and integration of European citizens in 
social and political life, with widening socio-economic inequalities and the resurgence of extreme-right 
parties in the wake of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. This paper attempts to evaluate the democratic 
development of the EU through the use of a process-oriented approach, and concludes at the end with 
discussions on the various options that the EU and its citizens can take to reform democratic processes 
and institutions in Europe. 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
AND OPTIONS FOR EU DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
 
DEXTER LEE1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Initially conceived by six Western European nations 
as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in 1952 to safeguard peace and economic progress 
in Western Europe, the European Union (EU) is 
widely acknowledged as a successful example of 
economic and political integration of nation states 
today. Numerous treaties have shaped the EU’s 
economic and political institutions, and a slate of 
democratic institutions have also been gradually 
developed. The European Parliament - the world’s 
only directly elected legislature at the 
supranational level – is an established body that is 
directly accountable to the citizens of the EU, and 
EU citizens now possess extensive political and civil 
rights by virtue of the introduction of European 
citizenship. All twenty-eight member states of the 
EU are consistently recognised in major 
international indicators and surveys as 
"democratic" (Freedom House 2014).  
 
However, there are critics who believe that the EU 
suffers from a so called “democratic deficit” even 
as it seeks deeper and closer integration. 
Substantial powers have shifted over the years to 
the EU, while closed-door decision making by 
Europe’s elites has taken on a greater role amidst 
the falling interest in European elections. This has 
led to a weakening of inclusive institutions and 
mechanisms for democratic rights. In the wake of 
the debt crisis in the Eurozone, the widening socio-
economic inequalities and the resurgence of 
extreme-right parties, all these have placed strains 
on democratic institutions in EU member states. 
                                                        
1  Programme Executive, EU Centre in Singapore. The author 
would like to thank Dr Yeo Lay Hwee for her comments on 
the paper. The views expressed in this working paper are 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the EU or the EU Centre in Singapore. Any shortcomings 
or errors are solely the author’s. 
This paper attempts to evaluate the democratic 
development of the EU through process-oriented 
approach, and concludes at the end with 
discussions on how proposed reforms should 
concentrate on enhancing democracy of and by the 
people. 
 
(1) Approaches to Pan-European democracy (1950 
to present) 
 
Democracy, according to Tilly (2007: 7) can be 
defined in four ways: constitutional/formal, 
substantive, procedural and process-oriented. 
These approaches essentially boil down to two 
ways that we can look at democracy, namely, 
process-oriented or government of and by the 
people versus substantive approaches to 
democracies in terms of government for the 
people (Buehlmann and Kriesi 2013: 45). The 
process-oriented approach is of deep significance 
for representative democracy in the European 
Union as the key question that this paper seeks to 
address is the ongoing process of democratisation 
in the multilevel European Union today: it is 
important to consider what are  the processes 
involved in forming this multilevel European polity, 
how the presence or lack of key processes and 
institutions impact  democracy, and what steps, if 
any, can be taken by citizens and politicians to 
reform or enhance the processes. Robert Dahl’s 
five minimum criteria for democracy - effective 
participation, voting equality, enlightened 
understanding, the exercise of final control over 
political agenda, and the inclusion of all adults – is 
a useful starting point in the study of 
representative democracy in the European Union 
(Dahl 1997: 37-38). In a later work, Dahl (2000: 85) 
even goes further to suggest that large-scale 
democracy is best implemented through elected 
officials, free and fair elections, freedom of 
expression, alternative sources of information, 
associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship. 
 
There is no doubt that these processes and 
institutions defined by Dahl are essential to the 
study of democratic states, and could also apply to 
supranational polities such as the European Union 
– after all, a process-oriented approach here 
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entails the set of relations between elected bodies 
and citizens. However, there is also a need to build 
on the process-oriented approach laid out by Dahl, 
and to incorporate a broader understanding of 
historical institutionalism, which defines 
institutions as formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in 
organisational structure of polities. In particular, 
more emphasis is required in understanding path 
dependence and asymmetries of power here to 
explain how institutions develop and why they 
remain weak or stable after decisions have been 
taken place (Hall and Taylor 1996). Charles Tilly’s 
(2007: Chapter 8) study of democracies has led him 
to  identify three master processes that shape the 
strength or weakness of democracy: the 
integration of trust networks into public politics, 
the insulation of public politics from categorical 
inequalities, and the dissolution of autonomous 
coercive power centres. Tilly’s approach has not 
been used to study political processes outside of 
the nation-state level, but this paper aims to 
incorporate a broad enough approach including 
inequalities and power asymmetries into the 
analysis of democracy and democratisation in the 
EU. By studying how inequalities and asymmetries 
are created in the EU polity, this could be beneficial 
in crafting solutions for the future. 
 
(2) Europe, the European Union and Democracy: 
An Overview 
 
Post-war Democracies and a United Europe 
through Integration 
 
Democracy in Europe took some time to 
consolidate following the Second World War – 
after all, it was only in the 1980s did Western 
Europe become uniformly democratic – but it is 
now essentially the “only game in town” (Kriesi 
2013: 1). Indeed, the lesson learnt from the failure 
of peace in Europe between two devastating wars 
was that in order for Europe to be stable, 
prosperous and free, the dangers of extreme 
nationalism and the possibility of future wars had 
to be reduced. From the ashes of a post Second 
World War Europe, governments had to deliver 
strong democratic states through socio-economic 
inclusiveness, the integration of trust networks and 
the control of the agenda within national borders. 
First and foremost, social and economic 
inequalities that had emerged during the inter-war 
period were corrected through the development of 
social welfare systems. At the same time, Western 
European states weaned the people from the 
extremes of autonomous groups by including them 
in the decision making processes through 
democratic institutions that guaranteed universal 
suffrage, accountability and extra-parliamentary 
participation. Arguably, these political 
developments set the stage for Western Europe’s 
economic resurgence in the latter half of the 20th 
century, and in doing so, created the ideal political 
and economic environment during the post-war 
years for integrationists such as Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman to press ahead with an age-old 
dream of a unified Europe. 
 
It must be emphasized that the European Union 
(EU) is not a federal nation-state, but rather, it can 
be described as a polity with multi-level 
governance to “internalize externalities” (Karr 
2008: 127). The founders of the EU initially 
adopted an intergovernmental approach to 
international cooperation at the very beginning, 
where treaties rather than a constitution mediated 
policy externalities resulting from cross-border 
economic activity - the Council of Ministers 
performed its role as the representative of national 
ministries, the European Commission served as the 
EU’s executive body or its civil service, and the 
European Parliamentary Assembly – later renamed 
the European Parliament in 1974 – was the 
deliberative body for national MPs to discuss 
European issues. Nevertheless, it was in the 1980s 
where national leaders took a neo-functionalist 
approach towards uniting Europe and agreed that 
it would make sense to deepen integration in other 
areas - the Single European Act of 1986 engineered 
the establishment of a single market as well as 
acknowledged the role of the European Council, 
and the Maastricht Treaty formally extended the 
existing policy structures of the EU to include, 
amongst other things, a layer of horizontal 
accountability through the development of 
supranational political institutions. Nevertheless, 
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Monnet’s and Schuman’s dream of a federal  
Europe has yet to come to fruition –  an attempt to 
draft  a  EU constitution was rejected in the  
referendums in France and the Netherlands, 
putting  the brakes on neo-functionalism driven 
integration. The EU thus remains a complex multi-
level polity, but this did not bring an end to the 
European democratic experiment. On the contrary, 
the EU has placed more emphasis on developing 
the EU’s democratic institutions after the failure of 
the constitutional referendums, and much of what 
was in the Constitution was retained in the Treaty 
of Lisbon. 
 
Democracy in Institutions and Treaties 
 
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) explicitly 
states that the EU “shall be founded on 
representative democracy” (Article 10 TEU), but at 
the time of the ECSC’s founding a pan-European 
representative democracy was not the key issue at 
hand – peace and economic co-operation was 
considered more important than the polity's 
democratic legitimation, which at that time 
functioned with representatives from national 
parliament (Rose 2013: 2 and Nettesheim 2005). 
Nevertheless, there was a push for pan-EU 
representative democracy resulting in the 
introduction of direct elections through universal 
suffrage for the European Parliament in 1979.  
 
After further changes in the Maastricht and Lisbon 
treaties, the European Parliament (EP) is now a co-
legislator with the European Council through the 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure, meaning that it is 
now equal with the Council in all competences 
except for agriculture and new policy fields. 
Furthermore, the EP has parliamentary oversight 
over the EU’s budget, the power of assent for all 
international agreements in fields governed by 
ordinary legislative procedure, and the power to 
elect the President of the European Commission 
(Europa: Treaty of Lisbon and Article 14 TEU). 
Through decades of legislative activity, the EP has 
firmly established itself as an institution that 
maintains a high level of openness, transparency 
and accountability in the sense that public 
discussions, plenary sessions of committee 
meetings and voting procedures are truly 
accessible, and it is “independent” in the sense 
that MEPs answer to voters and not member state 
governments ((Stie 2013: 168-171 and Kluver 2013: 
35). These changes have enhanced the 
representativeness and accountability of the EP, 
bringing it more in line with the basic expected role 
of legislatures in representative democracies. 
 
Other measures in the recent treaties have placed 
more emphasis on new democratic ideals and 
processes. Firstly, the centrality of democracy 
remains a non-negotiable aspect of membership. 
Aspiring member states have to fulfil, among other 
criteria, the acquis communautaire and the 
Copenhagen criteria before they are allowed to 
join the EU. Simply put, nation-states that wish to 
join the EU must be democracies (Rose 2013, TEU 
and European Union 2012). Secondly, the 
Maastricht Treaty confirmed the role that national 
legislatures play in approving EU treaty 
modifications, the transposition of directives into 
national law, and the “influencing” of the decisions 
of government officials in the Council of Ministers 
(Pollak and Slominski 2013: 148).  
 
In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty extended to national 
parliaments the role of a second channel of 
democratic legitimation - national parliaments are 
now informed about the decisions and draft 
legislations of the Council of Ministers, and the 
“Early Warning Mechanism” empowers them to 
flag EP proposals for action if such proposed 
legislation is more effective at national than EU 
level (Pollak and Slominski 2013: 148-149, Micossi 
2009: 223 and TEU Article 10). Since the 
implementation of the Single European Act in 
1986, the EU has begun to incorporate public views 
through interest group engagement for the 
purpose of enhancing policymaking. Alongside the 
EU’s specialised networks of regulatory agencies, 
consultative status has been conferred upon 
important organisations such as unions, business 
interest groups, consumer groups and public 
interest advocacy groups, (Kluver 2013, Kar 2008 
and Micossi 2009: 226-227). The Lisbon Treaty also 
introduced a “citizens’ initiative” where European 
citizens can petition commissioners to develop 
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legislation in important areas of public interest 
(Miccosi 2009: 226 and Article 11 TEU). 
 
The innovation with arguably the greatest direct 
impact on European citizens’ democratic identity is 
supranational citizenship rights. “European 
Citizenship” is enshrined in the Maastricht and 
Lisbon Treaties, as well as the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of 2009. This citizenship is 
“complimentary” to national citizenship, and it 
includes familiar fundamental political rights such 
as the right to vote, the promise of periodic 
elections, the right to stand in these elections 
regardless of residence in the EU, and the freedom 
of movement within the European Union (Articles 
10, 11, 21 and 45 TEU and EU Charter 2009). So far, 
the idea of European citizenship has been 
positively received – the result of the last 
Eurobarometer indicates that 59% of Europeans 
feel like citizens of the European Union (European 
Commission 2013).  
 
It is worth noting that the idea of a “European 
democratic identity” contradicts the view that 
democracy presupposes a “demos” and as such, its 
continued existence is only possible in the context 
of a nation state and not a polity such as the EU 
(Greenfield 1992). Indeed, theorists such as 
Kielmansegg (2003: 57) have argued that a 
politically resilient identity of the Europeans does 
not exist because Europe lacks a demos, but this is 
based on an ethno-cultural rather than "political" 
view of the “demos”. In contrast, writers such as 
Habermas (1995) argue that collective identity is 
not a precondition, but rather, a consequence of 
the creation of political institutions, while Follesdal 
and Hix (2006) warn against assuming a European 
demos as a prerequisite for genuine EU democracy 
as a European democratic identity could form 
through the practice of democratic competition. 
Indeed, these developments in Europe and views 
on an EU “demos” are in line with Dahl’s view that 
the most important criteria for democracy in any 
polity include political participation, voting equality 
and the inclusion of all citizens, and these must be 
supported institutionally in terms of elected 
officials, free and fair elections and inclusive 
citizenship. 
(3) Democracy in danger: the deficit in the EU and 
de-democratisation in member states 
 
It is not hard to see that, on paper the treaty 
changes to develop EU-wide democracy has met 
the criteria of Dahl's six distinctive criteria, and the 
EU can be considered “democratic” in the formal 
and constitutional sense. Nevertheless, the actual 
process towards a genuine Europe-wide democracy 
is far from ideal, as the EU continues to suffer from 
a “democratic deficit” which can be said to be a 
deficit of substantive and process-oriented 
approaches to democracy (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 
Hix 2008, Weiler et al. 1995 and Rohrschneider and 
Loveless 2007). Negative views towards the EU 
have increased - the latest Eurobarometer (Dec 
2013) suggests that the proportion of European 
citizens who are pessimistic about the EU has risen 
substantially since 2007, while two-thirds of 
Europeans feel that their voice does not count in 
the EU. Also, there is a trend of continued falling 
turnout in European elections, with a new low of 
42.54% recorded in the 2014 European elections 
(Kroet 2014). The increased pace of integration has 
meant that national legislatures are increasingly 
bypassed in decision making on matters that 
affects member states, and the widening of 
categorical inequalities such as unemployment 
combined with populist politics is fuelling de-
democratisation in several member states 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2013: 2). Ultimately, 
the weaknesses in democratisation in the 
multilevel EU can be understood by examining key 
processes and mechanisms of institution building 
at the EU level – indeed, the effects of these 
processes and mechanisms over the years not only 
affect how the EU's democracy is mismanaged in 
Brussels and Strasbourg, but also, how member 
states' democracies ultimately suffer from the 
systematic transfer of competences to EU 
institutions at the expense of inclusiveness. 
 
A deficit of democracy in the EU 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, European 
integration has, and still is, primarily driven by 
political leaders or trustees through engrenage or 
“spillover” (Rose 2013: 41), and this experiment in 
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regional integration has resulted in a multi-level EU 
where the Commission, Council and Parliament 
engage in deliberation and decision making on 
directives and regulations for managing 
externalities at the highest EU level. Indeed, the 
underlying reason why the “deficit” exists is that 
the development of the EU has been “for the 
people” rather than “by the people”, and 
democracy in the EU has been facilitated by its 
trustees through “integration by stealth” rather 
than by the input of its citizens. As Jurgen 
Habermas (2013) argues, the downside of 
establishing this supranational bloc through 
engrenage has meant that substantively, leaders 
and institutions have prioritised “output” 
legitimacy over “input” legitimacy and endorsed 
processes that support the “permissive consensus” 
of its citizens (Lindberg and Schiengold 1970). The 
clearest sign that all is not well today is the decline 
of this type of consensus post-Maastricht, where 
the failed constitutional reform and the Eurozone 
crisis have contributed to a “constraining 
dissensus” instead (Down and Wilson 2008). In 
essence, democracy in this multilevel polity was 
built on weak people-oriented foundations and is a 
stumbling block for accountability, transparency 
and responsiveness of European institutions (Kriesi 
2013: 8). Ultimately, it can be said that the deficit is 
a result of not adequately including Europeans in 
the EU’s decision making processes, as well as the 
failure to integrate the trust networks between the 
institutions themselves and the citizens they 
represent.  
 
While the European Parliament's powers and co-
decision activities have increased in recent years to 
help it gain credibility as an accountable and 
responsive representative institution, the EP’s 
share of problems associated with the deficit has 
been brought about by the general process of 
developing European institutions to deliver 
substantive outcomes without invoking more 
process-oriented inputs from citizens (Stie 2013: 
167-171 and Karr 2008). Unlike national 
parliaments, the EP’s “responsiveness” problem 
compounded by a “lack of politics” (Schmidt 2006), 
where cross party co-operation in decision making 
trumps true representativeness of voter 
preferences. Indeed, the parties in the EP often 
work closely together on finding solutions to 
European issues rather than go against each other, 
and, taking into account the lack of politics, the EP 
and its MEPs asymmetrically represent citizens in 
the sense that it can justify its response to 
decisions on the basis that that they represent 
everyone regardless of voter turnout (Rose 2013: 
107). In terms of policymaking, the EP’s new role as 
a co-legislator in Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
(OLP) has meant that it is increasingly reliant on 
the use of trilogues, or informal tripartite meetings 
attended by representatives of the EP, the Council 
and the Commission, in the deliberation of policies 
and directives. However, the drawbacks of such 
trilogues are that the Council can now negotiate 
directly with majority party leaders in the 
European Parliament at the expense of committees 
and minority parties, and agreements are often 
reached before they can be deliberated. Indeed, 
the OLP is arguably one area where the EP suffers 
from systematic non-transparency and non-
accountability in the decisions that it makes 
through its committees at an early stage, and the 
trilogue process adds to the systematic exclusion of 
European citizens from being involved in important 
decision making areas (Kardasheva 2012, Stie 2013: 
167-171 and Karr 2008).  
 
Next, it is important to note that the gap in 
democratic accountability and transparency has 
been facilitated by the non-inclusive processes and 
mechanisms in the European Commission, the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers. In 
terms of democratic decision making, these 
institutions have benefited more than the EP due 
to “permissive consensus” created by institutional 
design, and while some decisions by the Council 
and Commission can be considered as responsive 
to the needs of European citizens, issues relating to 
exclusionary processes of deliberation and 
decision-making in these European bodies have 
had a harmful effect on democracy at the EU level. 
The Council is a body where national executives 
are subjected to an indirect chain of accountability 
to national electorates, but most deliberation and 
decision making work is not undertaken by these 
executives but rather, the Council's working 
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groups, the Secretariat and Coreper. These groups 
take care of daily tasks including work on the OLP 
dossier but often behind the scenes, thus 
reinforcing the Council's non-transparency and 
weak accountability (Karr 2008: 99-100). Similarly, 
decisions in the non-elected European Commission 
are often taken by invisible actors due to technical 
complexity of subject matters, and concerned 
European citizens can expect concluding press 
statements on these institutions' positions on 
issues rather than a clear account of how decisions 
have been made (Stie 2013, Miccosi 2009: 226-
227, Gilardi 2008 and Lavenex 2013: 122). Most 
importantly, these exclusionary practices in 
European institutions were not created overnight, 
but rather, through decades of sustaining informal 
and exclusive mechanisms of internal 
communication and deliberation since the passing 
of the Single European Act and subsequent EU 
treaties.  
 
Last but not least, the expanded role that special 
interest groups play in a multilevel and networked 
polity like the EU is another major factor in this so 
called “deficit” or weakness of EU democracy. Since 
the mid-80s, the EU has attempted to include more 
voices in policymaking through expanded interest 
group engagement due to the aforementioned 
weakness of representative democracy in the EU 
(Kohler-Koch 2007). Indeed, many single-issue 
groups are often engaged by the EU in this 
relationship precisely because EU institutions such 
as the Commission and Parliament often require 
information, financial resources, as well as citizens’ 
support to achieve their objectives. In particular, 
both sides stand to win when citizens support is 
courted, as this vital asset increases interest 
groups' chances to influence policymaking as well 
as the EU's efforts to appear responsive (Kluver 
2013: 215-217). However, by and large these 
processes have led to EU institutions relying heavily 
on output legitimacy rather than delivering the 
input legitimacy that they seek, and also, these 
institutions have systematically built barriers to the 
inclusion of citizens in EU decision making. While 
Kluver insists that the high number of business 
interest groups in the EU lobbying process is not a 
sign of an inherent systematic bias, the evidence at 
hand suggests that lobbying success is stronger in 
groups that do not have to aggregate interests, are 
institutionally and financially stronger, and who 
have a better relationship with EU institutions (Karr 
2008: 171-172). The privileged position of stronger 
and better-endowed interest groups results from 
the EU’s failure in integrating public trust networks 
in these deliberation and decision making 
mechanisms, and the main outcome is  the erosion 
of citizens’ sense of being included in the political 
process. In the long run, imbalanced interest 
representation is a threat to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the policymaking process in the EU. 
 
In sum, the main consequence of such embedded 
processes and informal institutions is the failure to 
include European citizens within European decision 
making, as well as missed opportunities to 
integrate public interest groups into EU decision 
making. Although low voter turnout could be a 
result of voter indifference towards the EU or, at 
best, their implicit support of the basic consensus 
in EU policymaking, it may also be the strongest 
sign of continued citizen de-legitimation of a 
European democratic process that does little to 
engage its key stakeholders in policy deliberation 
and decision making (Micossi 2009: 222, Rose 
2013: 109-11 and Lord 2013: 243-245).  It is 
perhaps no surprise that the systematic alienation 
of citizens - a vital trust network in any democracy - 
from decision making processes in the EU has led 
to a falling interest in European politics, leading to 
a record number of eurosceptics and extreme-right 
candidates being elected into the EP in 2014. More 
worryingly, the EU's current weak attempts in 
democratisation and sustaining citizen interest in 
the European politics could inevitably reduce 
incentives for its leaders to deal adequately with 
this deficit in democracy (Krivanek 2012). 
 
Internationalisation of democracy in a multilevel 
EU: a challenge to social equality and civil rights 
  
Democracy in a multilevel EU must also be 
understood in the context of the 
internationalisation of politics and its impact on 
democratic governance in its member states. 
Indeed, the growth of international and 
EUC Working Paper No. 22 
 
8 
 
supranational bodies in the globalised world 
account for the “vertical transformation of 
democracy” where the spatial reconfiguration of 
the political system involves the de-bordering of 
societal and political transactions commonly 
associated with nation states, yielding new perils 
for the exercise of democracy as societies move 
towards more technocratic based practices at the 
international level (Lavenex 2013a: 106-107).  
 
In the case of the EU, the internationalisation of 
democracy via the transfer of competences to the 
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council reflects a growing 
asymmetry of powers between the EU's political 
elites and national parliaments. Indeed, such 
transfers of decision-making powers to the EU 
mean that national executives have less reason to 
include their parliaments in decision. A prominent 
example of this is how the  Eurozone crisis was 
handled – in the international fora consisting of 
national executives, heads of international 
organisations and EU institutions where national 
legislators were systematically excluded in the 
deliberation process and subsequent 
responses.(Lavenex 2013a: 118-119, Lord 2013: 
236-238 and Winzen 2010: 8-11). Although 
national parliaments are equipped with the “Early 
Warning System” mechanism that gives them a 
greater say in the decision making process of the 
EU, this procedure has been rarely used, and it 
could even generate more uncertainty about the 
roles and responsibilities of various institutions (De 
Wilde 2012).  
 
As the EU grapples to resolve its most severe 
financial crisis in the midst of trying to build 
notions of democracy and citizenship, the 
aforementioned vertical transformation of 
democracy combined with neoliberal economic 
policies play an important role in the widening of 
inequalities. The increasing phenomenon of 
“contractualisation of citizenship” (Somers 2008) 
has meant that European and national citizenship, 
instead of being reciprocal but non-equivalent in 
terms of rights and obligations, are increasingly 
being eroded through elite and technocratic 
attempts to save the Eurozone and the European 
integration project. The widening inequalities 
within and between nation-states as reflected in  
figures on poverty, youth unemployment, and the 
socio-economic exclusion of minorities further 
erode social and political trust networks (Birdwell 
et al 2013). The  fiscal austerity measures agreed to 
by the Eurogroup to resolve the Eurozone crisis has  
worsened youth unemployment, with record high 
of 59.2% recorded in Greece in December 2013 
and an average of 23.2% recorded across the EU 
(Eurostat 2014). At the same time, a recent report 
by the European Commission has noted that, in the 
wake of the Eurozone crisis, 24% of the EU’s 
population is now at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion and 9% live close to severe material 
deprivation (European Commission n.d). The 
changing face of Europe’s demographics has meant 
that Europe’s minorities such as immigrants and 
stateless peoples now face new problems in social 
exclusion in terms of discrimination and racism – in 
particular, the Roma people face socio-economic 
exclusion from social services such as education 
and social services and do not have political rights 
despite being residents of the EU (Benhabib 2002 
and Birdwell et al 2013). In terms of trust 
networks, member states in Eastern Europe and 
the Mediterranean are failing to protect their 
citizens from corruption and organised crime – 
corruption and organised crime groups have 
certainly increased in the wake of the Eurozone 
crisis, and citizens have indicated that they are 
increasingly affected by corruption in their daily 
lives (European Commission 2014).  
 
The disintegration of public trust and the widening 
of social inequalities have also led to the re-
emergence of extreme-right politics and the 
erosion of civil-political rights in the EU’s member 
states. The transfer of decision making functions to 
the EU, the slow adoption by citizens of the 
internationalisation of democratic functions from 
nation-state to Brussels (Lavenex 2013a: 112) and 
the resurgence of national identity (Turner 2011: 7) 
has meant that there is a further erosion of trust 
between national politicians and their citizens, and 
in turn, this has given extreme-right and 
eurosceptic groups space to establish themselves 
in both the national and European parliaments  
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from Greece to Sweden (Boréus and Hübinette 
2012). These extreme-right and eurosceptic groups 
often focus on the failings of the EU to promote 
populist and xenophobic solutions – such as exiting 
the European Union and curtailing non-European 
immigration - as a way out of the current imbroglio 
(Van der Brug and Fennema 2003: 69). In terms of 
the strength of democracy in member states, the 
EU's new Eastern European members have a 
shorter history of being democracies, and their 
trajectories of democratisation and state capacity 
are correspondingly weaker than their Western 
European counterparts. Worryingly, there is a 
growing trend towards a de-democratisation in 
countries such as Hungary and Romania where the 
strength of the extreme-right has had a 
transformative effect on governing parties. The 
evidence in Hungary and Romania points to 
governing elites eroding the rule of law, curbing 
political opposition, gaining more control over 
state resources, and tolerating corruption leading 
to a host of socioeconomic problems (Wiktorek 
and Otarashvili 2013 & Abtan 2013 and 
Tismaneanu 2012). Perhaps what should worry EU 
leaders in Brussels and other European capitals is 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s confident 
belief that Hungary’s membership of the EU does 
not preclude his administration from building an 
“illiberal state” on new national foundations 
(Mahony 2014).  
 
(4) Challenges and options for the EU’s democracy 
in the 21st century 
 
The recent comments of Hungarian Prime Minister 
Victor Orban are against the spirit of the acquis 
communautaire, and in essence, the EU’s belief in 
liberal democracy. These comments point to a real 
danger that the EU might become less interested in 
resolving its problems with democracy, focusing 
instead on other technocratic elements of the EU’s 
further integration such as trade policy. Indeed, it 
would be too easy for the EU’s leaders to narrowly 
focus on the successful elements of European 
integration instead of addressing the flaws in the 
European democratic project, namely, the weak 
accountability and transparency of EU decision 
making bodies, the systematic exclusion of public 
trust networks from public decision making, the 
erosion of civil-political rights and the ever 
expanding social inequalities such as 
unemployment and poverty which could have a 
negative impact on democracy. These flaws pose 
serious challenges to the longevity of the EU’s 
supranational democracy, and in the long term, the 
challenge to its democratic identity.  The challenge 
for the EU’s leaders and democracy advocates is 
putting the EU back onto a path where democracy 
is forged by, rather than for its citizens. 
 
There is no shortage of ideas to overcome the EU’s 
deficit in democracy, both in the pro-integrationist 
camp and among those who call for more caution 
on integration. Among the pro-integrationist 
solutions include the call for treaty revision to 
create more balanced powers in the EU (Vesnic-
Alujevic and Nacirinothis 2012) so that the 
European Council, through the downgrading of the 
notion of national sovereignty, is on an equal 
footing with the European Parliament in decision 
making powers (Habermas 2013); German finance 
minister Wolfgang Schauble’s proposal for a 
President of Europe to balance the EU’s increased 
powers (Deutsche Welle 2012); and instituting a 
European referendum system for citizens to vote 
on EU treaties and register their views directly 
(Richard Rose 2013: 154), There are also proposals 
to develop a standard EU parliamentary democracy 
where parties fight for elections in a two chamber 
Parliament with a “Prime Minister of Europe”  (Hill 
2013) or contest for additional seats through 
Europe-wide lists in order to create vital space for 
political contestation (Duff 2011, Duff 2012 and 
European Parliament 2011). Among the cautious 
include the “demoicracy” approach where the EU 
would not be treated nor developed as a singular 
political entity but as one that is judged on the 
basis of having multiple “demoi” (Nicolaïdis 2013 & 
Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2012, 2013). Indeed, 
this “intermediary realm of political justice 
between national and international politics” may 
be suited for an increasingly globalised world 
where political institutions and rules should be 
devised to observe the overarching common good 
while respecting domestic limits to 
internationalisation (Sandra Lavenex 2013a: 134), 
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and is certainly in line with Glencross’ view (2011: 
364-365) that the nation-state still has a major role 
in legitimating the EU.  
 
Resolving the root causes of the democratic deficit 
is a priority, but any options developed will have to 
take into account several factors. First, while some 
political changes are desirable for democracy, the 
EU is constrained in the use of amending treaties 
to reform institutions because it has to act within 
the scope of previous decision making processes 
and mechanisms. For example, further treaty 
changes to create a new presidential system or 
grant decision making powers to the EP must 
overcome the issue of gaining the endorsement of 
the majority of citizens and sovereign member 
states. Second, it may also be important to explore 
where balance can be struck between the needs of 
policymakers and those of citizens – in a rather 
complex polity, trilogues and closed door sessions 
may be required in the early stages of decision 
making so that decision makers can build mutual 
trust and make initial decisions, but this is provided 
that the EU firmly establishes a point in the 
deliberation and decision making process where 
the actions of the three main EU institutions are 
made open to the public for further scrutiny (Stie 
2013: 189). Last but not least, the biggest danger 
to take note of, especially in the case of pro-
integration reforms, is the continued dominance of 
democracy building by EU’s trustees at the expense 
of national legislatures and citizens. Further treaty 
changes could once again involve more non-
accountable and non-transparent decision making 
by political leaders, and this may not be suitable 
for a polity that already faces citizens’ “constraining 
dissensus” towards more elite centred moves.  
 
Indeed, a multitude of treaty changes to craft new 
institutions and powers may even draw our 
attention away from reducing the deficit in 
substantive outcomes of equity and social equality 
such as the inclusion of minority groups in 
deliberation and decision making at the EU and 
national levels, and in process-oriented outcomes 
where all European citizens are adequately 
integrated into the deliberation and policy making 
mechanisms at the EU level. Tackling the deficit in 
substantive outcomes would also require EU 
leaders and citizens to place greater emphasis on 
“practicing democracy” (Hughes 2012) or process-
oriented approaches to democracy in order to 
achieve a greater degree of equality, accountability, 
responsiveness, transparency and legitimacy in the 
EU’s democratic polity. Given the current 
institutional set-up of the EU, such approaches 
would emphasize the working process of practicing 
democracy, meaning that citizens or demoi are able 
to have a bigger say in the European system to deal 
with the deficit in accountability and transparency 
in the EU brought about by the insularity of 
member states’ elites and asymmetries of power.   
 
The EU currently has several non-treaty options 
that it can pursue to achieve stronger democratic 
outcomes. First, in terms of working with existing 
political institutions, the EU can continue to forge 
genuine EU political competition by building upon 
the recent changes to the election of the 
Commission President. Second, it can draw upon 
the untapped avenue of national parliaments to 
legitimate EU decisions. Last and most important, 
the EU can play a part in developing citizen 
empowerment in the political process. 
 
Genuine EU Political Competition 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, one major 
problem that hinders proper democratic 
participation and representativeness is the creation 
of an EU political system by the EU’s trustees to 
deliver on output legitimacy through “integration 
by stealth”. This is evident in the EU’s centrist 
policy regime that restricts, among many things, a 
proper European wide debate about structural 
reform of the EU economy (Hix 2003). The 
outcome of such a policy regime has been the fall 
in voter turnout as EU citizens become less inclined 
to engage with EU politics, hence leading to the 
failed inclusion and integration of citizens into the 
democratic politics that the EU is trying to build.  
One way to overcome this current deadlock is 
through increasing the level of political 
competition at the European level. So far, EU 
leaders have heeded the need for a more 
competitive system in the EU by being creative 
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during the 2014 European elections, which saw for 
the first time the fielding of candidates for the 
Commission Presidency by Europe's main political 
parties, televised debates, and the subsequent 
election of Jean-Claude Juncker by the European 
Parliament in July 2014. Granted, the horse-trading 
by the European Council to nominate Juncker 
proved embarrassing, European elections still 
remain “second order” and political competition 
between the centre-left and centre-right remain 
minimal with the formation of a “grand coalition” 
after the May 2014 elections, but these changes 
have brought a fresh injection of accountability to 
the selection of Commission leaders and has 
created higher stakes for future democratic 
elections where lead candidates will have to 
compete on policies and programs. 
 
Political competition is a wholly new area for EU 
leaders and citizens to focus on and as Hix argues, 
the outcome of political competition is beneficial 
to EU democracy because it can help to overcome 
institutional gridlock, promote policy innovation, 
preference changes and issue linkages, and also 
increase accountability and transparency (Hix 
2006). Instead of wholesale treaty changes to inject 
more democracy the EU has several doable options 
to help bring about competition between parties 
and to encourage political debate on EU issues in 
member states. First, pro-system parties in EU 
member states should be upfront on EU issues, as 
voters will have to vote for national parties in order 
for their vote to count towards the respective 
European party in the European elections. 
Conservatives/Christian Democrats, Socialists, 
Liberals, Greens and the far-left have already 
banded closer together with their fellow 
counterparts to overcome European policy 
constraints in order to influence policy outcome 
(Hix 2011). Now that European elections are 
emerging as a high stake game for power these 
parties should have a greater incentive to further 
coordinate and develop more coherent European 
policy programs. The closer national parties work 
together in a European party setting, the more 
effective they would be able to compete with other 
party groups vying to take charge of the 
Commission. Secondly, the EU should follow up on 
improving political competition among parties by 
introducing transnational lists for European 
Parliament elections in order to “europeanise” the 
political debate. Here, parties would have to 
become full-scale European campaigning 
organisations competing on the basis of political 
ideologies and political platforms - thus giving 
genuine choices to voters, who could then vote 
accordingly in support of their preferred 
candidates, policies, and programs. The winning 
party and candidate would then be able to claim a 
legitimate democratic mandate to lead (Hix 2006 
and Lambsdorff 2012). At the end of the day, a 
gradual improvement in political competition 
would provide further accountability and 
transparency in the European electoral process, 
and EU citizens would be further integrated into an 
increasingly competitive European polity. 
 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
 
As Lord (2013: 236) argues, “insufficient 
parliamentary control over EU decisions is the 
original sin of the democratic deficit”. National 
legislatures are actually less embedded in the 
politics of EU decision making and therefore can 
take on a more prominent role at the European 
level instead of having to “fight back” individually 
(Raunio and Hix 2000). National parliaments are 
the main approvers of EU funds  (Grant 2013) and, 
as the direct channel of democratic representation 
in member states, they are equipped to use their 
“legitimation” role to enhance the EU's democratic 
legitimacy (Knutelska 2013: 34). It is worth noting 
that legislatures have previously cooperated on the 
EU’s “yellow card” mechanism against a 
commission policy on labour, and they have also 
gotten together to discuss Eurozone governance 
and a financial stability treaty (Knutleska 2013 and 
Grant 2013). Therefore, deeper instances of inter-
parliamentary cooperation are certainly feasible 
and can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, 
legislatures would be able to fill in the legitimacy 
gap in areas that the EP cannot, and given time, 
could create an independent second sphere of 
democratic representation in the eyes of EU 
citizens. Secondly, inter-parliamentary cooperation 
can help overcome EU institutions lack of 
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accountability and transparency. Parliaments could 
cooperate to form a European Parliamentary 
Forum where MPs can ask questions, file reports 
on aspects of EU and Eurozone policymaking, 
gather information without going to national 
executives, scrutinize the European Council’s 
decision on foreign and defence policy, as well as 
elect the Eurogroup President (Grant 2013). Also, 
the proposed “red card” mechanism to give 
national parliaments the right to block unwanted 
legislation could also bring back democratic 
accountability over EU decision making (Grant 
2013). 
 
There is no doubt that for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation to work, the political incentive to 
increase the involvement of national parliaments in 
EU affairs must be present among the national 
MPs. It can be argued that national legislatures 
would not win back sovereignty by cooperating, 
and that there are political difficulties to get 
parliaments to agree on policies (Synon and 
Forsyth 2013). Nevertheless, such arrangements 
would actually entrust more crucial law-making 
responsibilities to national parliaments in a bloc 
where national sovereignty is slowly becoming 
secondary. Furthermore, inter-parliamentary 
cooperation to get things done at the European 
level would require parliaments – both national 
and EU - to behave and function as a cohesive 
group. This is something that MPs must develop 
through an ongoing process of proposed inter-
parliamentary cooperation between national and 
European parliaments in order to allow these 
institutions to forge a stronger cooperative role in 
EU law-making processes at the European level. 
Taking into account the segmented roles of the EP 
and national legislatures is important, but this 
multilevel model of cooperation where national 
parliaments would collectively monitor the 
principle of subsidiarity and the EP would take 
centre stage as a liaison to its national counterparts 
would allow for versatility and a coherent inter-
parliamentary force at the EU level (Crum and 
Fossum 2013: 255-256). 
 
 
 
Empowering citizens and strengthening 
citizenship rights 
 
While European citizenship has helped foster a 
sense of pride in “being European”, its value would 
be further degraded should the EU’s citizens 
continue to be systematically excluded from 
political processes in Europe.  After all, democracy 
is not just about electoral participation but also 
about equality, inclusion and integration in the 
broader political process, and the EU can do much 
more to improve citizens’ access to public politics 
so as to strengthen their inputs in deliberation and 
decision making. First, the European Citizens 
Initiative (ECI) can be further enhanced to provide 
more avenues for citizens to have a direct say in EU 
affairs. Although the ECI suffers from design issues 
such as the strict timeline for groups to obtain 
petition signatures, the process can benefit from 
an extended period to campaign and collect 
signatures, as well as allowing future ECI initiatives 
to propose treaty amendments (ECI Campaign 
2012). Second, public interest groups can be 
further integrated into the EU’s decision making 
processes in order to overcome the systematic bias 
contributed to by stronger interest groups. This can 
be done by actively strengthening weaker public 
interest groups through  funding and majority 
requirements, institutionalise lobbying in the EU by 
registering groups, creating transparency through 
disclosure of interests and improving information 
channels, provide more resources and regulations 
to strengthen the independence of officials, and 
enable these bodies to self-correct themselves 
(Karr 2008: 177-182). Lastly, with regards to 
growing illiberalism in extreme-right politics, more 
can be done to protect the citizenship rights of EU 
citizens. The Union’s rapporteur for fundamental 
rights has suggested the creation of an “Alarm 
Agenda” and a “Copenhagen Commission” to 
monitor democracy and human rights compliance 
within the EU (European Parliament 2013). 
Although this would entail interference in member 
states’ domestic affairs, these mechanisms are in 
the interests of EU’s citizens and would guarantee 
better protection against potential future 
violations without resorting to diplomatic sanctions 
(Habdank-Kolaczkowska and Csaky 2013).  
EUC Working Paper No. 22 
 
13 
 
As mentioned above, democracy is not just about 
electoral participation, and recent evidence in 
opinion polls has suggested that citizens want to 
express their voices beyond elections (Kiez and 
Nanz 2014). In an increasingly multicultural EU, 
there is a growing need to reinvent the European 
community by encouraging EU citizens from 
different member states to discuss important 
socio-economic issues with each other. Similar to 
the inter-parliamentary cooperation model 
mentioned previously, Kiez and Nanz (2014) 
propose a European consultative Council of 
Citizens that would give permanence to and a 
tangible impact by wide-ranging citizen debates 
covering major issues – no decision making power 
would be given to this consultative body but it is 
envisaged that the EP, Commission and Council 
would then have to consider the recommendations 
and questions that emerge in this Council. 
Arguably, this bold idea would go further than the 
citizens’ initiative by including citizens, campaigns 
and networks in a process of cross-national 
cooperation, and such civic solidarity and the 
strengthening of European civil society, as 
Habermas (2013) argues, can help forge a lasting 
partnership between citizens and political elites in 
the EU. For example, it can be envisaged that such 
a council can eventually use the ECI process to 
campaign and petition for changes to be made to 
dysfunctional EU policies, back public interest 
groups in their dealings with EU institutions, and 
help to create a political environment where citizen 
rights are protected. Nevertheless, the success of 
the Council of Citizens and the other initiatives 
ultimately depends on how political actors, public 
interest groups and citizens are able to successfully 
develop “bottom-up” citizen involvement; this 
must also take into account the integration of 
weaker and underprivileged groups into European 
governance in order to include them in discussions 
about European policy. 
 
(5) Conclusion 
 
To summarise, previous decades of deeper 
integration in the EU have failed to integrate 
citizens and public interest groups in European 
decision making and other aspects of democratic 
deliberation.  At the same time, the vertical 
transformation of democracy has also undermined 
the inclusion of national institutions in the 
European integration project and has played a 
major role in widening economic and political 
equality in the EU. Nevertheless, the desire for a 
more democratic European Union remains, and 
this paper has argued that instead of difficult  
treaty changes, more emphasis should be placed 
on “practicing democracy” (Hughes 2012) to foster 
substantive democratic outcomes. The processes 
and mechanisms presented in this paper - a 
competitive political sphere for European political 
parties to debate policies and programs, 
cooperation among national parliaments to further 
scrutinize the EU, and the integration of citizens 
into political decision making processes through 
more deliberative and participatory mechanisms – 
are doable without the need  to resort to massive 
treaty  changes, and can help foster greater 
ownership of the EU’s democratic project by its 
citizens, trustees and stakeholders. The list of 
options in this paper is certainly not exhaustive, 
and more ideas are expected to emerge in the 
future. 
 
Before ending, it is worth remembering that 
democratization is an ongoing process of progress 
and reversal (Tilly 2007: Chapter 8) - it is not 
always the case that democracies remain fixed on a 
smooth development trajectory as they may face 
irregular periods of democratisation and de-
democratisation. Therefore, it would be naïve to 
predict the future direction of the EU’s democratic 
trajectory, as it remains to be seen whether the 
practice of democracy in the manner outlined in 
this paper EU would develop as envisaged – 
whether such initiatives could take root would 
depend on whether EU leaders, national 
institutions and citizens are able to seize critical 
junctures and opportunities to develop policies or 
coalitions that address the flaws of Europe's 
democratic deficit. Nevertheless, the minimal 
criteria for equal and just democracies – Dahl’s 
criteria of effective participation, voting equality, 
enlightened understanding, the exercise of final 
control over political agenda, as well as Tilly’s 
criteria of the inclusion of all adults, integrating 
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trust networks into public politics, insulating 
citizens from categorical inequalities, and the 
dissolution of autonomous coercive power centres 
– remains the same, and it is hoped that any future 
creative proposals that seeks to address the flaws 
in democracy within the European Union should 
certainly look beyond the constitutional and 
procedural approaches to take into account 
process-oriented approaches and options that can 
break down inequalities and asymmetries in power. 
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